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JURISDICTIONU.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)(j) confers jurisdiction of this appeal on the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, on or about 09/14/07, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2-4 and Rule 42a of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court transferred this
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

I S S U E S & S T A N D A R D S for R E V I E W No. 1-

Did the trial court err in dismissing the Complaint when
it used findings/legal conclusions from a different lawsuit
against Appellants?

v

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Order @ 12-13, 15-16,17, Opposition @ 2-3, points 2-11; 6, 7,11 -12,
Transcript @ 11-12.
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is that of a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate
review of the question of law looks for "correctness" of the trial court's legal
conclusions and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, [UT., 1993]; Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah,
1994]. The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous
standard, i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v.
Allstate, 973 P.2d 932,937 [Utah, 1998]; Grossen v. DeWitt, 369 Ut. Adv. Rpt.
31,32, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209,1214, [Ut. Ct.
App., 1999].

No. 2-

Did the trial court err when it made and then used unsupported
"conclusions" to dismiss the Complaint?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Order @ 12-13,15-16, 17, Opposition® 2-3,points2-11; 6, 7,11 -12,
Transcript @ 11-12.

vi

Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is that of a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate
court review of a question of law looks for "correctness" of the trial court's legal
conclusions and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, [UT., 1993]; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah,
1994].
The standard for review of the factual errors isfroma clearly erroneous standard,
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932;
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999].

No. 3-

Did the trial court erred in refusing Appellants the opportunity
to amend the Complaint without offering any justification?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 5,10,13, Transcript @ 13.
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is an abuse of discretion, i.e., there is no reasonable basis
for the decision. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 400,405 [Utah,
1998]; Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, [Ut.
Ct. App., 1999]; Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270; Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,
476 [Ut. Q. App., 1993].
vii

No. 4-

Did the trial court erred when it made a wholesale
adoption of the defense position?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 4-5, Transcript @ 12-13,
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is an abuse of discretion, i.e., there is no reasonable basis
for the decision. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 400,405 [Utah,
19981; Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management 979 P.2d 363, [Ut.
Ct. App., 1999]; Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270; Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468,
476 [Ut. Q. App., 1993].

No. 5-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil perjury
cause of action, in violation of the Utah State Constitution's
guarantee of access to the courts to redress injuries?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 8-9,
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial

viii

court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993]
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994]

No. 6-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil
conspiracy claim before discovery engaged?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 9 - 10, Transcript @ 12-13.
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993]
State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994].

No. 7-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' wrongful use of a
civil proceedings claim in finding Appellants' settlement in the
earlier action was not a "favorable termination?"

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 6-7,

***********

ix

Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where
the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993]
State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994]

No. 8-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' abuse
of process claim?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 10-11,13.
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is a mixture of law and fact. The standard for review of a
challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where the reviewing court looks
for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT., 1993] State v.Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
[Utah, 1994]
The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard,
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932;
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999].
x

No. 9-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' perjury claim
concluding Appellants knew, or should have known, of the
perjury when Defendants filed the counter-claim in February,
2000?

Preservation of IssueRecord:
Opposition @ 2- 3, points 3-11,11-12, Transcript @ 11-12.
Standard of ReviewThe standard for review is a mixture of law and fact. The standard for review of a
challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law where the reviewing court looks
for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,235, [UT., 1993] Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
[Utah, 1994]
The standard for review of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard,
i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young
v. Young, 979 P.2d 338; [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932;
[Utah, 1998]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, [Ut. Ct. App., 1999].

CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY PROVISIONSAU courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person .... shall have remedy by due course of
law,.... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting ....
any civil cause to which he is party.
Utah Constitution- Art. 1, Sec. 11

xi

U.C.A. 78-11-8:
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract
or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new cause of
action arise therefrom
************

S T A T E M E N T of CAS EAppellants sued Defendants alleging:
1-

Wrongful Use of a Civil Proceedings,

2-

Civil Perjury,

3-

Obstruction of Justice,

4-

Abuse of Process and,

5-

Civil Conspiracy.

Defendants did not Answer but immediately brought a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the written
position papers and hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted
Defendants' motion and dismissed all five of Appellants' claims.
In their Opposition, Appellants had requested an opportunity to amend the
complaint if the court found it defective. They also requested the action proceed
with the parties having the benefits of discovery. The court denied both requests

xii

finding that Appellants could not cure the shortcomings in their complaint under
any set of facts.

STATEMENT of FACT SDefendants/Appellees hired Plaintiffs/Appellants Puttuck and Breakthrough to
build a high-end, residence home in Park City. In December 1998, Defendants
fired Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs sued them for breach of contract. Defendants
Answered and asserted $500,000 in counter-claims for cost overruns while
Plaintiffs/ Appellants were on the job. Subsequently, the case settled with
Plaintiffs recovering about $80,000 from Defendants and Defendants completely
surrendering all of their counter-claims.
The contractor Defendants hired after they fired Appellants was John Hale and his
company, Charis Construction. Later, Hale and Charis sued Defendants for breach
of contract under their contract to build/complete the same Park City home
Appellants were earlier building for Defendants. Defendants Answered and
counter-claimed against Hale and Charis for $500,000 in costs overruns while they
[Hale & Charis] ran the project. In the Hale-Charis lawsuit, in a deposition,
Defendant Peter Gendron testified that the $500,000 in cost overruns asserted
against Hale-Charis substantially overlapped some 13 months with the same
period, with 13 months of the same incidents of mismanagement and cost

xiii

overruns, the Defendants had earlier cross-claimed against Appellants Puttuck and
Breakthrough.
Given the Defendants' testimony in the Charis lawsuit that reflected they had
knowingly counter-sued two different general contractors in two separate lawsuits
for the same, or substantially the same, incidents of mismanagement and cost
overruns, Puttuck and Breakthrough then sued Defendants for:
1-

Wrongful Use of a Civil Proceedings,

2-

Civil Perjury,

3-

Obstruction of Justice,

4-

Abuse of Process and,

5-

Civil Conspiracy.

Said claims were based on the Defendants' knowing wrongful defense of the
lawsuit, and the Defendants knowingly asserting false counter-claim against
Appellants in their first lawsuit.

Defendants move for dismissal and the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.

*********

XIV

S U M M A R Y of A R G U M E N T S Issue No. 1Throughout the trial court's Ruling and Order dismissing Appellants' Complaint, it
usedfindingsin the Hale-Charis lawsuit as conclusive findings against the
Appellants. The facts before the court clearly show that it misunderstood who
were the parties to the different litigations, i.e., Appellants were not parties to the
Hale-Charis lawsuit. Appellants assert that the court cannot simply take findings
in one lawsuit and use thosefindingsto "adjudicate" claims by a different party,
in a different lawsuit alleging different claims which occurred at different times.

Issue No. 2The trial court made several conclusions of law absent offering any factual support
or explanation of the basis for the court's conclusion. In made several conclusions
of law offering only general or overbroad factual support. In a few instances, the
trial court merely made a global, unspecified referenced to the defense position.
Finally, in other instances it based its conclusions of law on a clearly erroneous
understanding of the facts, the parties and the prior, underlying litigation. The law
requires specific findings of fact to support all legal conclusions. The trial court
failed to do this.

Additionally, The trial court relied upon many defense citations. The lion's share
of said citations were out of State cases and were findings made after lengthy
discovery, during trial and after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable here.

Issue No. 3The trial court dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims without permitting any
amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. The Complaint
put Defendants on fair notice of the claims against them. But the trial court relied
upon many defense citations outlined in their Motion. The lion's share of said
citations were out of State cases and findings made after lengthy discovery, during
trial and/or after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable.
Appellants believe if there were any defects in their Complaint, the trial court
should have permitted an opportunity to amend or cure their Complaint.

Issue No. 4The court dismissed Appellants' Complaint without ever giving them an
opportunity to amend it. The trial court concluded Appellants could not
appropriately amendment their Complaint under any circumstances or set of facts.
In concluding this, it used facts that were in error and facts from a distinct and
separate lawsuit against Appellants.

xvi

Further, the trial court relied upon many defense citations. The lion's share of
said citations were out of State cases and findings made after lengthy discovery,
during trial and after trial. Accordingly, they were not applicable here. Appellants
assert they deserved an opportunity to amend and it was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion to refuse to permit any amending.
Finally, generally under the laws of pleadings, one needs to put defendants of
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. Appellants Complaint
put Defendants on fair notice of what claims they were asserting against them.
Moreover, discovery had not yet commenced. Discovery is the legal tool to gather
more facts in support of one's claims.
Appellants believe the court was in error in making unsupported and clearly
erroneous conclusions of law.

Issue No. 5Appellants alleged one Defendant committed perjury in his deposition and that said
perjury reflected the Defendants had knowingly filed false counter-claims against
Appellants. Appellants filed a cause of action alleging civil perjury. Utah has a
perjury cause of action in the criminal code but none in the civil code. Upon that
basis the trial court dismissed the claim. Appellants asserted that the Utah

xvii

Constitution provides all citizens access to the courts to redress their legitimate
injuries and that the court's dismissal of this action violates the Constitution.
Additionally, the standard of proof in a civil context is far different than that
standard of proof in the criminal law and the difference in standards itself denies
Utahns a civil remedy.

Issue No. 6The court summarily dismissed Appellants' civil conspiracy cause of action
finding "one cannot conspire with oneself." But this is not what Appellants had
alleged. They alleged one Defendant committed perjury, the other defendant was
present at the purjurous statements and knew then that testimony was false and
later that Defendant permitted the perjury/falsehoods to be part and parcel of [his]
and the Defendants' defense in the Hale-Charis trial. Appellants believe they have
properly alleged sufficient facts that this claim should go forward.

Discovery is the legal tool available to litigants to find evidence supporting their
claims. The trial court erred in not permitting Appellants to go forward with
discovery.

* * * * * * * * * * *

xviii

Issue No. 7Appellants' earlier litigation against Defendants resolved by way of a settlement.
In that settlement, Defendants surrendered all their counter-claims and paid about
$80,000 on Appellants' claims against them with their insurer, State Farm
Insurance paying about $50,000 of the $80K.
Later, Appellants discovered that Defendants had knowingly filed false counterclaims against them in that earlier litigation. Appellants sued Defendants for
wrongful use of a civil proceeding claim. The trial court found that the "favorable
termination"findingrequired before a party can bring a wrongful use of civil
proceedings claim was not present in the "settlement" termination of their earlier
lawsuit. Thus, it dismissed this claim.
Case law reflects that a "favorable termination" can be found in the opinion of
someone, either the trial court or the prosecuting party, that the action lacked merit,
or if pursued would result in a decision in favor of the defendant. Appellants assert
that 1- their counsel was a "prosecuting party" and he would attest that the counterclaims lacked merit, and 2- that given the perjury behind the counter-claims "if
pursued they would result in a decision in Plaintiffs' favor' and, 3- when
Defendants surrendered all their counter claims and settled with Appellants paying
Appellants money that showed that the counter-claims lacked merit.

xix

Moreover, there is respected case law that that holds a settlement can be found to
be a "favorable termination" of an earlier civil lawsuit. Accordingly, Appellants
believe the court was in error.

Issue No. 8In dismissing the Appellants' "abuse of process" claim, the court erroneously
stated the Appellants wanted to re-litigate their earlier breach of contract dispute.
But the present causes of action have no breach of contract type claims but allege
only deceit, fraud and other tortuous claims.
The trial court continued and stated Appellants had an, "opportunity to litigate the
[counter-claims] in the earlier litigation." But Appellants did not become aware of
the perjury and the falsehood behind the counter-claims asserted against them until
Defendant Peter Gendron's deposition in the other, the later, Hale-Charis lawsuit
In November, 2003 [or even later at the Hale-Charis trial] long after the
Appellants' initial litigation with Defendants had settled.
Appellants assert that the statute of limitations should have begun to run once the
perjury was discovered. But the trial court found the Appellants knew, or should
have known of the false counter claims in Defendants' Answer.

Issue No. 9The trial court stated Appellants should have known of the falsity of the
Defendants' counter claim when it was first asserted with the Defendants' Answer.
But the evidence of the perjury and the false counter-claim was not discovered
until Defendant Peter Gendron's deposition in the second, Hale-Charis lawsuit in
November 2003. Appellants could not assert civil perjury against the Defendants
until they discovered the perjury which was long after their initial litigation had
settled.
Our statute of limitation begins to run when a party knew, or reasonably should
have known, that a claim existed. In the facts at bench, Appellants timely filed
their claims once they knew [or should have known] of the facts supporting their
perjury and obstruction of justice claims, etc. But the trial court found the
Appellants knew, or should have known of the false counter claims in Defendants'
Answer and dismissed this claim.
************

xxi

A R G U M E N T SMARSHALING EVIDENCEGenerally, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the challenged
judgment/findings and then go forward showing just why the marshaled evidence
is legally insufficient to sustain the judgment/verdict. But this base root of
appellate advocacy is not without exception. The operative laws state that if the
trial court's findings are legally insufficient, an appellant need not engage in a
futile marshalling of [insufficiently detailed] evidence. The appellate courts say
that if the trial court's findings are so insufficient that they fail to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings they fail to provide enough
information for a meaningful review by the appellate court. When the trial court's
findings are inadequate for a meaningful understanding by the appellate court,
appellant need only show the court's findings as legal insufficient. Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 639 [Ut. Ct. App., 1995]; Woodward v. Fazzio, 823
P.2d 474,477 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]
Appellants assert the trial court's findings are so "conclusionary," so lacking in the
tracking of any evidentiary basis underpinning itsfindings/conclusionsas to make
any "marshaling of the evidence" futile.

1

Appellants attack the trial court's ruling on a myriad of reasons. When Appellants
believe that under a certain dispute the court has offered findings based upon some
recited foundation, they then marshal the evidence on that dispute.

ISSUESNo. 1-

Did the trial court err in dismissing the Complaint when
it used findings/legal conclusions from a different lawsuit
against Appellants?

The trial court dismissed Appellants' Complaint by applying several findings
against Appellants made in an entirely different lawsuit. First, the court based its
dismissal on the fact that a jury in a different case [Hale & Chairs v. Gendron &
LRG - hereinafter Hale] involving the present Defendants found the Defendants'
counter-claim valid because the jury awarded money on that counter-claim.
Record, Order @ 13 But that "determination" was on a different counter-claim
against Hale that alleged different incidents of mismanagement occurring at
different times. Thus, the court adopted a jury's finding in a counter-claim against
Hale to conclude the Defendants' counter-claim against Appellants was valid. But
Appellants were not parties to the Hale litigation, so to apply Halefindingsagainst
them is error. See Caption pages of two prior lawsuits in Addendum, infra.
The court went on to confirm it misunderstood the issues stating that the
court in Hale had found that the individual Defendants had not abused the
2

corporate veil liability protections afforded them through Defendant LRG. It then
used the Hale finding against Appellants - concluding these defendants would not
be personally liable in the present claim. Record - Order @ 17
Additionally, in still addressing the counter claims, the court said Appellants
had an "opportunity to litigate that issue but plaintiffs settled the first Puttuck
litigation and lost the second litisation in a jury trial as to their claim for breach of
contract." Record, Order @ 15 Again, Puttuck [Appellant] was not a party to the
Hale jury trial so: he did not lose the second litigation in a jury trial.
The trial court's confusion continued. It said that Puttuck's settlement in the
first litigation suggests Puttuck considered the defendants' counter-claims of
mismanagement to have some merit. Record, Order @ 16-17 Though the facts
were in evidence, the court did not realize that Puttuck got the money in the
settlement and Defendants gave up their counter-claims. Record, Opposition @
44 point 7, 49 This suggests it was the Defendants who considered the counterclaims to be meritless.
The trial court cannot adopt findings in another case with different plaintiffs,
different plaintiff claims and different counter-claims, asserted at different times
and use those findings to dismiss Appellants' separate and distinct claims. To do

3

so clearly evidences the court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellants'
Complaint.
In Cazares v. Cosby, 65 P.3d 1184, 1189, [para 15] [Utah, 2003] the
appellate court found the trial court improperly dismissed a complaint after the
court engaged in an evidentiary hearing and used itsfindingsfromthat hearing to
dismiss the complaint. The Cazares court said the trial court erred when it applied
its ownfindingsof fact instead of viewing the factual allegations of the complaint
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Instantly, we find the trial court using its
findings from a totally different claim to dismiss the complaint while it ignored the
plaintiffs' factual allegations.
The trial court committed error on both its understanding of the facts and the
legal conclusions it applied to those facts. The fact application mistakes are clearly
erroneous, i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence. As concerns the legal errors, the review manifests that the trial court
was simply incorrect.

No. 2-

Did the trial court err when it made and then used unsupported
"conclusions" to dismiss the Complaint?

The trial court made far more conclusions absent any evidentiary base than those
manifest errors in applying the Halefindingsagainst Appellants.
4

It is the duty of the trial court to find facts upon all material issues submitted for
decision. State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d 276, 279, para 11 [Ut. Ct. App.,
2001]. In this instance, the trial court did not "find facts" but merely offered more
unsubstantiated "conclusions." To wit:
A-

If the Complaint went forward, every prevailing party would then sue again
because the losing party defended or counter-claimed.... Record @ 77 Order @ 11-12

This conclusion ignores the Complaint allegation wherein Appellants assert that in
the prior action, Defendant Peter Gendron committed perjury when testify about
the Defendants' counter-claims against Appellants. This was not merely an
unsubstantiated accusation for to compare Gendron's two depositions strongly
suggest his perjury. Record- Opposition @ 44-45, points 8-11; Transcript @ 1112, Complaint points 9-22, 30-31, 35-37, & 42.
This finding also ignores the fact that most times the aggrieved party does
not discover the abuse of process, the obstruction of justice, the wrongful use of a
civil proceeding, and the perjury and civil conspiracy perpetrated against him until
after the initial litigation is concluded. In fact, the law is legend that in a wrongful
use of civil proceedings, the prior litigation must have resulted in a "favorable
termination" for plaintiff. While the court recognized that principle, it still found
that the "settlement" between Defendants in the first Puttuck [Appellants] v.

Defendants lawsuit was not a favorable termination by an independent decision
maker. Record - Order @ 14. See arguments infra.

Likewise, this conclusion ignores the fact that anyone can file a lawsuit. Those
without merit fail, those with merit go forward. Subsequent claims frequently
follow-up earlier litigation. So long as the claims are different they go forward.
Presently, we have tort claims, earlier they were breach of contract type claims.

Most importantly, the trial court's overbroad statement in summarily discharging
all claims subsequent to an earlier lawsuit involving the same contract ignores
U.C.A. 78-11-8:
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract
or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new cause of
action arise therefrom.

In this instance, subsequent to the first Puttuck action, new, valid causes of action
arose against the Defendants.

B-

Hale sought punitive damages in the prior litigation, just as plaintiffs do
here, and there is simply no basis for it. Record - Order 90

The Court had no evidence, nor proffered any reasoning why it believed the
Appellants have no basis for their punitive damage claims. Discovery had not yet
commenced. It is the duty of the trial court to find facts upon all material issues
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submitted for decision. In this instance, the trial court did not find any facts; the
Record is barren beyond the court's opinion. Barren Records are error.

The trial court's findings of fact... were inadequate, where most of
the "findings" were conclusionary and more akin to conclusions of law,
and provided no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial's court
decision. Woodward v, Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 479 para 6 [Ut. Ct. App.,
1991].

Punitive damages are available when: ... the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentional fraudulent conduct,
or conduct that manifest a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others. U.C.A. 78-18-1 Punitive damages are available
under all of the tort causes of action Appellants alleged. Discovery could support
the claims but to dismiss before discovery is error. The court's conclusion is
absent any legal or factual foundation.

C-

If this case went forward, the trial would unavoidably be a trial over the
original building disputes... This complaint in reality is simply another
effort to prove plaintiffs in the building dispute. Record - Order @ 13-14

The instant claims do not address any building disputes or breaches of
contract. They are perjury, obstruction of justice, wrongful use of civil proceeding,
abuse of process, and civil conspiracy charges. Record @ 1 -11 Clearly, these are
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claims generated in the first Puttuck claim but not known/discovered until long
after the close of that litigation. Record, Complaint, points 8-22, Transcript @ 12,
Opposition @ 11-12. Thus, evidence concerning the original building disputes
would be only tangential to the proofs of the present tort causes of action.

The court's overbroad "reasoning" contradicts the plain dictates of U.C.A. 78-11-8

D-

Defendants would be required to attempt to prove the validity of their
counter-claims (which they already did in Hale to the satisfaction of the
jury)... Record - Order @ 90

The validity or invalidity of the counter-claim in Hale is not dispositive of
the validity of the defendants' earlier counter-claims against Appellants.

E-

Here however, these claims are just not merited andfail on many, many
levels as outlined by defendants. The court gives no further explanation
other than to say: there simply must be an end to things. Record - Order @
13 and the claims...are simply and completely without merit. Order @ 14
Just why are the claims not merited? Why do they fail on many, many

levels? What are the arguments outlined by defendants, that the court relied upon?
Given the trial court's order, we are left to guess at the answers.

F-

The trial court dismissed all of the Appellants' claims without permitting

amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. It concluded,
void any recitation of evidence or reasoning that: Appellants could not properly
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plea their claims. It concluded: theses claims ... are without merit and must be
dismissed. No further factual findings or legal conclusions were offered to support
its findings. Record - Order @ 90, 95 Opposition @ 55, Transcript @ 14 And it
so concluded before any discovery.

G-

Finally, notwithstanding two lawsuits with different plaintiffs with different

allegations covering different times, the trial court concluded the Hale litigation is
part and parcel of these claims. Record, Order @ page 17 They are not. They are
separate and distinct actions with different plaintiffs filed at different times. See
Caption pages of two prior lawsuits in Addendum, pages 42 & 43.

To make such governing conclusions and then deny the aggrieved party any
inkling on the reasoning behind the conclusions is universally held to be error. The
trial court needs to properly rule on the issues presented to it. It must make
"findings." The Record is silent; there is no indication of the reasoning underlying
the court's ruling. When the record is silent in not providing the reasoning of how
the court arrived at its findings, the findings cannot be upheld. This court's rulings
run contrary to the law's mandates under a long, clear, legal history. To wit:

Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." [citation]
9

[Like here] in the instant case, the court failed to separate its findings
of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52a. Campbell
v, Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 para 2 & 3 [Utah Ct. App, 1995]

The trial court's findings of fact... were inadequate, where most of the
"findings" were conclusionary and more akin to conclusions of law, and
provided no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial's court decision.
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,479 para 6 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]

Because the trial court's finding is devoid of any analysis concerning
the statutory criteria for advancements, the finding cannot be upheld.
It was error to conclude that the sums of money given by Emily were
advancements without applying the statutory standard for making such
a determination. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 para 26 [Utah, 1999]

Like in Young, because we don't know what statutory standard the court
used in making such a determination the finding is error. And the court's
foundationless conclusions are fatally defective to the dismissal of the Complaint.

Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
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judgment." The findings of fact must show that the court's judgment
or decree "follows logically from and is supported by, the evidence."
The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached. State v. Real Propertv-633 East 640
North, 942 P.2d 925, 931, para 9 [Utah, 1997]
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in
a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute under proper
rule of law. To that endfindingsof fact should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. The rule as
stated in Prows v. Hawlev, 271 P. 31 [Utah, 1928] is that: until the court
has found on all the material issues raised by the pleadings, the findings
are insufficient to support a judgment; and thatfindingsshould be
sufficiently distinct and certain as not to require an investigation or
review to determine what issues are decided. Rucker v. Dalton, 598
P.2d 1316,1338-1339, para 2 [Utah, 1979].
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The trial court's factual errors go against the clear weight of the evidence. It
then applied the wrong law to the factual errors. Justice demands the vacation of
the court's findings.

No. 3

Did the trial court erred in refusing Appellants the opportunity
to amend the Complaint without offering any justification?
The trial court dismissed all of the Appellants' claims without permitting

amendment to the Complaint and before any discovery had begun. It concluded
Appellants could not properly plea their claims. It concluded: theses claims ... are
without merit and must be dismissed. No further factual findings or legal
conclusions were offered to support its findings. Record - Order @ 15-18
Opposition @ 55, Transcript @ 14 While Appellants requested an opportunity to
amend, the court refused the request. Record, Opposition, page 13. This is
manifest error.
Utah requires plaintiffs to put defendants on fair notice of the general nature
of the claims against them and an opportunity to meet them. Appellants clearly did
so. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366,1374
[Utah, 1996]; Rule 8, U.R.C.P.; Williams v. State Farm, 656 P.2d 966,971
[Utah, 1992].
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Discovery would enable Appellants an opportunity to strengthen their claims
with more evidence. To assume a party cannot state a claim for relief needs to be
based on more than the court's speculations. It needs to be certain from the record
that there are no facts that could support a claim. This Record is empty rather than
certain.
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the
record did not persuade the appeals court that there were no set of
facts under which defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-CraigOlson, 815 P.2d 1356, 1362 [10] [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only
if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of its
claims. Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons, 790 P.2d 107, 110 [Ut. Ct.
App., 1990]; Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 [Utah, 1991]
To deny a party an opportunity to amend their complaint without articulating the
reason is an abuse of discretion. See Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497,501 [1-2]
[UtCt. App., 1999].
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to state reasons for its denial
of a motion to amend the complaint, and the reasons for the denial were
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not apparent from the record. "A district court's refusal to grant leave to
amend without any justifying reason is, per se, an abuse of discretion."
[citation omitted.] Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Dev., 970
P.2d 1273, 1281-1282, para 17 & 18 [Utah, 1998]
Appellants assert they deserved an opportunity to amend and it was an abuse of the
trial court's discretion to refuse to permit any amending.
No. 4

Did the trial court err when it made a wholesale
adoption of the defense position?

The trial court adopted many defense out-of-State, citations. These citations talked
of a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in attacking the Complaint.
This is the standard used after lengthy discovery, during trial or after trial.
Appellants objected that a- such a standard was inapplicable at the pleading stage,
b- because it was error when there had been no discovery, c- because many of the
citations were extra Utah and thus, not controlling and, because d- the complaint
was sufficient in putting the defendants on fair notice of the claims against them.
Record - Order @ 90, Opposition @ 46-47; Transcript @ 12 - 13. Appellants
argued simply that these citations were not applicable. But the court adopted the
defendants' citations without stating why it believed they were governing.
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The court continued: the counter-claims did not seek the same amount of
damages, they did not rely upon the same alleged mismanagement. Records,
Order @ 15 Appellants argued different facts alleging that Defendants were
seeking the same damages monies against Hale and Appellants for incidents of
mismanagement that occurred long after Appellant had left the job. Record,
Opposition, pages 2-3, points 6-11, Page 6, Transcript 11-12

Appellants had

alleged the defendants counter claims against Appellants covered a substantial
period of time when Hale, not Puttuck was the general contractor. If incidents of
mismanagement took place long after Appellants left the job, they are not liable for
such mismanagement. For Defendants to knowingly accuse them of
mismanagement when they knew Appellants were not liable for they were not on
the job is wrong and an abuse of process. Record, Opposition @ pages 44-45, 5354, Transcript @ page 11-12
The court adopted the defendants' "facts." A court should not merely adopt a
party's position. Bright v. Westmoreland County. 380 F.3d 729, 731-732
[U.S.D.C.A., 2004] In mechanically adopting the adverse party's position the
court abused its discretion. State v. All Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278, para 6
[Ut. Ct. App., 2001] Appellants have a right to an independent review of their
claims.
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Further, the court erred in applying a post discovery standard of proof, a trial
standard of proof at the pleading stage. In not being the applicable standard of
proof for a motion to dismiss, the court misunderstood the law. The court's
misapprehension of the law is itself an adequate basis to remandfor
reconsideration. Campbell, supra @ 640 para 4.
Finally, generally under the laws of pleadings, one needs to put defendants
on notice of the issues raised and give them an opportunity to meet them. See
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough & Williams, supra. Plaintiffs'
Complaint put Defendants on fair notice of what claims they were asserting against
them. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss.
Interestingly, in Defendants' motion, they proffered to the court two
California cases, Rana v. Singh, and NMSBPCSLDHB v. Chavez, Record,
Motion To Dismiss, page 4. California has prohibited courts and parties from
citing or relying upon either case because neither case was "officially reported."
Given that the court adopted the defendants' "authorities," this raises two
questions: 1- did the court rely upon such authorities and, 2- how detrimental to
Appellants was the court's reliance. There are no answers in the Order. Without
the answers, the trial court's findings must be reversed.
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It is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the adverse
party's position without offering any foundational reasoning for such adoption.
This finds the trial court having no reasonable basis for its decisions.
No. 5-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil perjury
cause of action, in violation of the Utah State Constitution's
guarantee of access to the courts to redress injuries?
Record, Order @ 14 Opposition @ 8-9

Appellants alleged a Defendant committed perjury in his second \Hale] deposition
in November,'03. That perjury reflected that Defendants' original counter-claim
against Appellants was false. Utah has a perjury cause of action in the criminal
code but none in the civil code. Upon that basis, the trial court dismissed the
claim. Record Order, page 14. Appellants assert that the Utah Constitution
provides all citizens access to the courts to redress their legitimate injuries and that
the court's dismissal of this action violates the Constitution. Record, Opposition,
page 8. Additionally, the standard of proof in a civil context is far less burdensome
than the standard of proof required in criminal law. Presently, if one suffers from
civil perjury but cannot prove the perjury facts "beyond a reasonable doubt" he/she
has no redress for their injury. This higher burden of proof also deprives the
injured of their right of access to the courts.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person .... shall have remedy by due course of
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law,.... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting ....
any civil cause to which he is party.
Utah Constitution- Art. 1, Sec. 11

In Homes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 848 [2] [D.C., Ct. App.,
1998], plaintiff brought a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. This District
Court had not recognized that cause of action before. But the court adopted it
saying: new torts are recognized when an interest requiring protection from
unreasonable interference is identified; and that a plaintiff advancing a novel claim
in this jurisdiction will not necessarily be precluded from recovering. This is
Appellants' predicament. The court went on to say:

If we are in one of the "open spaces" in the law of this jurisdiction we
must fill it as well as we can, with a view to the social interests which
seem to be involved and with such aid as we can get from authorities
elsewhere and from "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the
accepted standards of right conduct." We cannot evade this duty; for
unless we establish a right in the plaintiff we establish a privilege or
immunity in the defendant.... In recognizing the independent tort action,
we do not exercise a legislative function; rather, we perform our duty to
decide "a question of policy" well within the framework of traditional
and accepted negligence principles. Id. @ 848-849 [underscore added]
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In Harmon City v. Neilsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,1171 [Utah, 1995],
the Supreme Court denied an ERISA preemption of the plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims because to do so, "would leave them without any legal remedy."

Later, in keeping with that same reasoning, in DOIT v. Touche, Ross &
Co., 926 P.2d 835, 842 Ftnt.ll [Utah, 1996] the same Court indicated merely
because a cause of action had not been recognized did not mean it would be
precluded by such novelty:

... we have been unable to find any legal precedent which indicates
that such a cause of action exists in Utah

Thus, even if we were

to recognize that such a cause of action exists in Utah, plaintiffs
have failed to properly plead it.

[underscore added]

Under the Constitutional mandates of the "open courts" provision together
with the Supreme Court's "need-to-do justice, reasoning," Utah needs to address
an injury for which it presently provides no redress and adopt a civil perjury cause
of action. To do otherwise gives immunity to wrongdoers and leaves victims
without a remedy.
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Obstruction of JusticeAppellants make the very same argument against the trial court's dismissal
of their "obstruction of justice" claim. This cause of action followed the civil
conspiracy claim. In the trial court's Order immediately after addressing the civil
conspiracy claim it said: That too relies on the same basis. Record, Order, page
15. We are left to guess what the court meant by using the term "on the same
basis. " Assuming arguendo, the trial court dismissed this cause of action because
it is not recognized in Utah's civil law protections, Appellants incorporate the
foregoing arguments and authorities set forth immediately above under their civil
perjury claim and asserts those same arguments against the trial court's dismissal
of Appellants' obstruction of justice claim.

Additionally, Appellants argue that because the court offers no support, no
reasoning for its conclusion Appellants and all reviewers are left to guess how the
court arrived at its conclusion. Under the dictates of: State v. All Real Property,
Campbell Woodward, Young, State v. Real Property - 633 E. 640 N., Prows
v. Hawley and Rucker, all supra, this court must vacate the trial court's
conclusion.

Again, on this claim the court continues in its erroneous applications of Hale
findings [the Hale's jury findings on the validity of the Defendants' counter-claim,
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etc.] against the non-party, Appellants. Record, Order page 15. Appellants here
incorporate their arguments against the trial court applying the Hale findings
against Appellants they set forth under Issue No. 1, supra.

The trial court's dismissal of this cause of action ignored the governing law
requiring reversal of the dismissal.

No. 6-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' civil
conspiracy claim before discovery engaged?

The court summarily dismissed this cause of action finding: one cannot conspire
with oneself. Record, Order page 16 While this is true, it is not what Appellants
had alleged. They alleged one Defendant committed perjury, the other defendant
was present at the purjurous statements, knew then they were false and later
permitted the falsehoods to be part and parcel of the Defendants' defense in the
Hale trial. Record, Opposition, pages 9-10. Legally, in certain situations, one
person can "ratify" the misconduct of another and under such ratification the
ratifying person can be held liable. Instantly, the court misunderstood the facts and
the misunderstandings led to improperly dismissing this cause of action.
Appellants' Complaint had alleged Defendant Peter Gendron conspired to assert
false counter claims against them and that Defendant William Gendron was aware
of the falsity of the counter-claims and subsequent to Peter Genrdon's deposition,
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William Gendron adopted or ratified his brother's perjury. Record, Complaint @
points 20, 30, 31, 37, 38,42, & 47.

Importantly, discovery had not yet commenced. Discovery is the legal tool
to gather more facts in support of one's claims. On the facts in issue, how can a
court conclude there was no conspiracy when there has been no discovery? The
parties use discovery to find evidence to complete their initial broad factual
allegations. Discovery could further support Appellants' allegations. To make
such a finding before discovery has commenced is error. To make such a finding
when the trial court ignores the allegations of the complaint is also error for the
court is to "deem the allegations of the complaint as true." See law ofHunsaker
v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897-898 [Utah, 1993] and St Benedict's Dev. v. St
Benedict's Hopsital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 [Utah, 1991].

No. 7-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants' wrongful use
of a civil proceedings claim in finding Appellants' settlement
in the earlier action was not a "favorable termination?"
Record, Order @ 14

The court found Appellants settlement in the earlier action was not a "favorable
termination." It said Appellants needed to show: an independent decision maker
determined the court claim of defendant had no merit. Record, Order page 14
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Requiring an independent decision maker is not the law. Misuse of legal process
becomes actionable when it is used primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it
was not designed. To state a claim for abuse of process, a party must allege both
an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the process not proper in the regular conduct
of the proceedings. To satisfy the willful act requirement of a claim for abuse of
process, a party must point to conduct independent of legal process itself that
corroborates the alleged improper purpose. Hatch v. Davis, 147 P. 3d 383, 389390 [para 36 & 39 ] [Utah, 2006]. Appellants alleged that the Defendants'
improper motive was to intimidate and harass them and to injure Appellants'
business reputation. Further, Appellants assert for one to commit perjury in a
deposition is a "willful act in the process not proper in the regular proceedings" of
that earlier lawsuit. Additionally, Appellants argue another "willful act" was the
Defendants knowingly asserting counter-claims clearly attributable to Hale against
Appellants. Record, Complaint @ point 25, Opposition pages 10-11.
In Lacknerv. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d. 747, 750, [Cal. 1979], the Supreme
Court said a "favorable termination" needs to reflect the opinion of someone, either
the trial court or the prosecuting party, that the action lacked merit or if pursued
would result in a decision in favor of defendant. Appellants assert that 1- their
counsel was a "prosecuting party" in the earlier action and via Rule 12 of the
U.R.C.P., Appellants' Complaint facts attest that the counter-claims lacked merit,
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2- that given the perjury behind the counter-claims if they were "pursued they
would result in a decision in Plaintiffs' favor" and, 3- when Defendants
surrendered all their counter-claims and settled with Plaintiffs [Appellants] paying
them money those points evidence the counter-claims lacked merit. Appellants
assert the settlement under these conditions is, or should be equated with a
"favorable termination" and thus, the cause of action should proceed.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that State Farm Insurance
paid Appellants some $50,000 [of $80,000] in settling the Appellants' claims. So,
we find State Farm, an interested party with financial interests at stake, believing
the Appellants' claims had merit and the Defendants', their insured's counter
claims were meritless. And since Defendants personally contributed $30,000 to
the settlement and surrendered all their counterclaims in this action also reflects
their belief in the merits of Appellants' claims and the lack of merit in their
counter-claims.
Appellants' research seems indicate that there is no direct Utah case law that
addresses a "settlement" in the context of being a "favorable termination" for the
subsequent prosecution of a wrongful use of a civil proceedings claim. But there
are respected, sister-state authorities that find a civil settlement that ends the
litigation to be a "favorable" termination.
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The question of whether there has been a settlement between the
parties or consent to a dismissal or acquiescence would be a factor
to be considered in differentiating a malicious prosecution pleading
based upon misuse of civil process from a pleading based upon
misuse of criminal process.
Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal.App. 2d 851, 854 [Cal. Ct. App., 1967]
This case meets all of the criteria mentioned in Webb. In the settlement
between Appellants and Defendants in the earlier lawsuit we find:
A-

There was a settlement;

B-

It concluded the litigation with Appellants dismissing their claims
and Defendants dismissing their counter claims with prejudice.

C-

Defendants consented to the dismissal of their counter claims;

D-

Defendants acquiesced in paying Appellants the settlement monies; and,

E-

Appellants dismissed their claims based entirely upon getting the
settlement monies.

Thus, the settlement here properly should be equated with a favorable termination.
In Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826 [Cal. Ct. App., 1978] the court
said:
... Of course where the termination of the former proceeding is not
on the merits it is somewhat more difficult to ascertain whether it
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indicates the innocence of the defendant in the action. Nevertheless,
the theory is the same in testing a dismissal or other termination
without a trial on the merits. "If it is of such a nature as to indicate the
innocence of the accused, it is a favorable termination sufficient to
satisfy the requirement. If however, the dismissal is on technical
grounds, for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent with his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination."

This settlement reflects the lack of merit in the Defendants' counter-claims
together with Appellants' innocence. It is not a technical dismissal. It is a
termination consistent with Appellants' innocence of the counter-claims.

In Hurgren v. Union Mutual Life Ins,, 141 Cal. 585, 588; [Cal., 1904] the
court said:

Nor can it be essentially necessary that there should be an
adjudication of the magistrate, or, indeed any judicial decision
upon the merits by any court.. ..the technical prerequisite is
only that the particular prosecution be disposed of in such a
manner that it cannot be revived

the mere discontinuance

of a civil suit, in any way, satisfies the rule.

Appellants settlement and dismissal of the parties claims fully meets the
"discontinuance of their earlier civil lawsuit" pre-requisite.

No. 8

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants9
abuse of process claim?

The court dismissed this cause of action by stating: the fourth cause of action is the
same. Record, Order @ 15 [The court does not reference the cause of action by
name. But "abuse of process" is the fourth cause of action in the Complaint,
(Record, Complaint @ 9)] What the court means by the fourth cause of action "is
the same" is not explained. One is left to guess what the court is thinking.

The court does say:
it relies again on plaintiffs simple attempt to relitigate the building
dispute. The counter-claim was directly related to the building issues,
claiming defendants had not breached the contract but plaintiff
Puttuck and Plaintiff Hale at various times had breached the contract
and caused damages to mismanagement. The counter claim did not
seek the same amount of damages they did not rely on the same
alleged mis-management. There was opportunity to litigate that
issue but the plaintiff settled the first Puttuck litigation and lost the
second litigation in a jury trial as to their claim of breach of contract
To now claim that in fact they should have one because defendants
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lied again does nothing but invite great mischief into our already
burdened system.

Record, Order @ 15 - 16

The court is confused with the facts:

A-

Appellant Puttuck and Hale are involved in two different lawsuits with
Hale's filing almost 3 years after Appellants.

B-

In Puttuck's first lawsuit, Defendants counter-claimed for $500,000 for
mismanagement occurring from 03/98 to 02/23/00.

C-

In Hale's lawsuit, Defendants counterclaimed for $500,000 for
mismanagement occurring from 01/07/99 to 08/20/00
Record, Complaint @ 3-4, Opposition @ 2-3, Transcript @ 11 -12.

Defendants demanded $500,000 against both plaintiffs for the same incidents of
mismanagement which overlapped for 14 months and as against Puttuck for 14
months after he had left the job in December 98. [Record, Opposition @ 2-3,
Transcript® 11-12]

D-

Puttuck could not litigate his abuse of process claim when it was first
discovered after his initial litigation had settled.

E-

Puttuck did not lose the second litigation in a jury trial as to their claim of
breach of contract. He was not a party to the Hale litigation and had no
claims against Defendants in that lawsuit.
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The elements of abuse of process are: an ulterior motive and a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular course of the proceedings. See Hatch,
supra @ para 34. Appellants had alleged an ulterior purpose in that Defendants'
filed their counter claim to "intimidate" Appellants. They alleged the willful act
not proper in the litigation proceedings was both knowingly asserting false
counter-claims and the perjured deposition testimony. Record, Complaint @ 9-10,
Opposition @ 6-7, 10.

Concluding, the trial court again dismissed the claim notwithstanding that
Appellants had alleged the elements of the tort, and because the court was
confused about the parties and issues before it. The trial court's reasoning is
directly contradictory to the facts and parties before it which errors wrongful
denied Appellants' the opportunity to fully present their claims.

No. 9-

Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellants9 perjury claim
concluding Appellants knew, or should have known, of the
perjury when Defendants filed the counter-claim in February,
2000?

The trial court concluded Appellants should have known of the falsity of the
Defendants' counter claim when it was first asserted in the Defendants' Answer in
the earlier Puttuck/Appellants v. Defendants' action. "It was either known to be
false from the first time it was alleged or it was not. " The court did not explain the
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basis for this conclusion. Record, Order @ 16 But Appellants alleged they did
not discover the evidence of the false counter-claims until Defendant Peter
Gendron's deposition in the second, Hale lawsuit, in 11/03. In February, 2000, at
Defendant Peter Gendron's first deposition, Appellants did not know he was lying
nor through the use of reasonable efforts could they have discovered Peter
Gendron's perjury. Record, Complaint, points 8-20, Opposition @ 11, Transcript
@ 12. Understandably, Appellants could not assert perjury against the Defendants
until they first discovered the perjury in November '03 when he testified about the
counter-claim in substantial contradiction to his 02/2000 testimony. This was long
after Appellants had settled their initial litigation with Defendants. Record,
Opposition @ page 2-3, points 3-11, pages 11-12, Transcript @ 11. Our laws
favor the Appellants' position.

Our statute of limitation begins to run when a party knew, or
reasonably should have known, that a claim existed.... Statute
under which limitations period governing actions for relief
from fraud or mistake does not accrue until discovery of facts
surrounding fraud or mistake....Klinger v. Calder, 791 P.2d
868, 869-870 [Utah, 1990]
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In the facts at bench, Appellants timely filed their claims once they knew [or
should have known] of the facts supporting the perjury and obstruction of justice
claims, etc. Appellants' discovery of the causes of action in November '03 finds
the Complaint filed within the four-year statute of limitations.
Tolling of Statute of LimitationsAssuming arguendo, Appellants filed their Complaint in breach of the statute of
limitations, the jurisprudence reasoning behind having a limited time within which
to prosecute one's claim is not without justifiably exception.
The discovery rule for tolling limitations period applies in three
situations: 1- where mandated by statute, 2- where defendant
concealed or misled claimant so, claimant did not become aware
of cause of action until too late; and, 3- exceptional circumstances
where application of general rule would be irrational or unjust.
Sew v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 637 [13]; citing Warren v.
Provo, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 [Utah, 1992]
Defendants' false counter-claims misled Appellants so they did not become
aware of the perjury and the false counter claims until after the statute has run.
Given the deceit, this court should toll the statute.
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To engage the exceptional circumstances or concealment versions of the
discovery rule, plaintiff must make an initial showing that plaintiff did not know
and could not have reasonably discovered the underlying cause of action. Walker
Drug v. La Sal Oil, 902 P.2d 1229,1231 [3] [Utah, 1995]. Appellants have done
this. Record, Opposition, pages 2-3, points 5-11, pages 3-4, points 1-3, pages 1112, Transcript @ 11-12.
Sew, goes on to offer a balancing test to determine if exceptional
circumstances exist to toll the statute. The test compares the hardships imposed on
Plaintiffs by denying to toll the statute against the prejudice to defendants resulting
from the passage of time by tolling it. Sew, supra, @ 636 [14-15] Here, to deny
finding exceptional circumstances will result in the Appellants having no remedy
for the financial harm they suffered. Whereas, to toll the statute does not result in
any prejudice to defendants "resulting from the passage of time."
Appellants present predicament in not unlike the Plaintiffs in Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 @ 4 [Utah, 1981]. In Myers, the court found that
where guardians had no knowledge of their ward's death ... and therefore no
knowledge that cause existed until after two-year limitation period had expired,
.. .the policy against stale claims was outweighed by unique circumstances. It thus

32

found, the trial court improperly dismissed the guardian's action on a statute of
limitations basis.
The policy against stale claims is also outweighed by the unique
circumstances of plaintiff s hardship. Defendant cannot establish
that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale claim since his
problems of proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than
plaintiffs'.

Myers, supra, @ 88 [3]

Exactly like in Myers, the present Appellees cannot show any prejudice. This is
especially true since all of the causes of action directly involve the defendants'
personal knowledge and their conduct/misconduct. There are no unavailable
witnesses, nor any lost evidence. It is fair for this court to find the statute tolled
until the Appellants first discovered the perjured testimony.
Alternatively, in Warren, supra @ 1129 [7] the court said the trial court
could side-step the balancing test where the case: presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of
the cause of action. So, in all events, Appellants believe this holding governs the
present state of the case.
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Complaint Allegations Are Deemed TrueA basic foundation of all determinations on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is that the court
is to accept as true the plaintiffs allegations:
we accept the factual allegations in the complaint to be true and
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn there from in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d
893, 897-898 [Utah, 1993] Accordingly, we state the facts in a light
most favorable to the party against whom the rule 12(b)(6) motion
was brought. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hopsital, 811
P.2d 194,196 [Utah, 1991]; Harmon City, supra, @ 1164, Ftnt. 2.
Again, in Wagner v. State, 122 P.2d 599, 602 [para 2 & 9]; [Utah, 2005] the
Supreme Court said:
On review of grant of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the Supreme Court must accept
the material allegations in the complaint as true....
Instantly, the trial court sided with the defense factual contentions. But to follow
the mandates of the law required the trial judge to accept the Appellants factual
allegations as set forth in their Complaint as true. If the trial court had followed
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the law, it would not have dismissed Appellants' complaint on statute of limitation
grounds.
Factual DeterminationsImportantly, for the court to find that Appellants discovered, or should have
discovered, the perjury earlier is a "factual determination" removing it from the
province of the trial court's authority. In Russell/Packard v. Carson, 78 P.3d
616, ... aff d. 108 P.3d 741, 751 para 40; [Ut.Ct. App., 2003], the court said:
the trial court erred in dismissing claims on grounds they were
barred by applicable statute of limitations. Whether plaintiff made
a prima facie showing that a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered the claims earlier was a factual finding that should be
decided by a jury, not a judge.
Instantly, the facts underlying the discovery question is fact question
needing to be resolved by a jury. Record, Transcript @ 13 Whether the discovery
rule tolls the statute of limitation is a (tclassic factual dispute " when there is
contrary factual evidence and properly should be resolved byfinderof fact. Sew,
@ 634, [9-10].
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The review of a court's interpretation of the statute of limitation is a legal
question inspected for "correctness." But in this instance, the court's application
of the statute of limitations is fact determinative. And here the court was in error
on the facts.

CONCLUSIONA basic tenant of our rules of jurisprudence is that: courts should be liberal in
allowing amendments to the end that cases may be fully and fairly presented on
their merits. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,408 [Utah, 1998]
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 [Utah, 1993]
Rule 15(a) of the U.R.C.P., talks about amending pleadings and in pertinent part it
says: .. .a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court.... and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires. Moreover, rule 15 should be interpreted
liberally so as to allow the parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. Timm v.
Dewsnup, supra, @ 1183; Sulzen, supra @ 501, para 13.
This trial court denied Appellants an opportunity to amend their complaint. It
based said denial on the fact that it made several conclusions of fact and of law:
a-

without offering any explanation for the court's reasoning,

36

b-

without offering any factual support,

c-

by offering "facts" there were in error, and,

d-

by applying the law in error.

No Explanations & No Factual SupportThe law, however, requires specific findings of fact to support all legal
conclusions.
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of
acts in a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute
under proper rule of law. To that end findings of fact should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1316,1338-1339 [Utah, 1979]
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Campbell,
supra, @ 638-639.
Instantly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to state reason for its
denial of a motion to amend the complaint, and the reasons for the denial were not
apparent from the record. Aurora, supra @ 1281-1282

Factual & Legal ErrorsThroughout the Court's ruling it used findings in the Hale lawsuit as conclusive
against the Appellants. A court cannot simply take findings in one lawsuit and use
those findings to "adjudicate" claims by a different party, in a different lawsuit
alleging different mismanagement claims which occurred at different times.
Simply put, findings against one party in one lawsuit cannot be applied to a
different party in a different lawsuit.
Ignoring Complaint AllegationsIn this instance, the trial court made its findings in a blatant disregard for the
"facts" set forth in the Complaint. Then it relied upon its findings to dismiss the
Complaint. This is wrong.
When reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, the court must
accept the factual allegations in the complaint to be true and
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn there from
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunsaker, supra, @
897-898; St Benedict's Dev., supra, @ 196.
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For the many reasoned arguments set forth hereinabove, this Court properly should
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the Appellants' Complaint. Appellants should
have the opportunity to fully present their claims. The defendants will have ample
opportunity to fully defend or defeat said claims through the regular processing of
the lawsuit.

Date: 27, December 2007

i Resmakfiilly submitted;
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PROOF of SERVICEI certified that I caused to be mailed, via first class U.S. P.S. mail, a true
and correct copy of the APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF on this
>th
28 day of December, 2007 to the following:

HEATHER WHITE

BRUCE LUBECK

Snow Christensen & Martineau
P.O.B. 45000
Salt Lake, UT 84111

Judge - District Court
6300 No. Silver Creek
Park City, UT 84098

( wo&ecuted in Salt Lake this day.
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ADDENDUMAPPELLANTS' REQUEST TO AUGMENT
APPELLATE RECORD
Comes now Appellants and respectfully requests the Court's permission to
augment the record on appeal.
At the time of the motion to dismiss now under review, Appellants referred the
trial court to the complaint, the date of filing and the parties in the prior litigations
of:
PAUL PUTTUCK & BREAKTHROUGH CONSTRUCTION
Vs.
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., and KENNETH B. McINTOSH
T.J.D.C No.: 99-0600212
Complaint, caption page - page
42
And,
JOHN HALE & CHARIS CONSTRUCTION
Vs.
PETER GENDRON, WILLIAM GENDRON, HANK LANGE
and LRG, Inc.
T.J.D.C. No.: 02-0500738 CN
Complaint, caption page - page
43
Appellants believe the addition of these pages will clarify the facts for the Court
and support Appellants' arguments.
***********

JOHN F. FAY, Esq.

*ul-. i|*lvi

USB No. 5691

Legal Counsel
P. 0. Box 68-1454
Park City, UT 84068-1454
Tel: 435.658.2441
Counsel for Plaintiffs

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH
PAUL PUTTUCK, an individual and
PAUL PUTTUCK dba, BREAKTHROUGH
CONSTRUCTION,

COMPLAINT TO FORCLOSE ON
REAL PROPERTY LD2N and FOR
PERSONAL JUDGMENTS.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PETER GENDRON, LRG, Inc., GENDRON,
LIM & COMPANY, and KENNETH
McINTOSH, and Does 1 thru 20, inclusive,

Civil No.: T?-fl6(R>2.a
JUDGE:

PAT BRIAN

Defendants.
Comes now Plaintiffs and allege:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
1)

Plaintiff Paul Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident of Park City, Summit County,

Utah all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district.
2)

Plaintiff Puttuck is now, and at all relevant times was, the sole owner of Plaintiff Breakthrough

Construction, a Park City, Summit County, Utah general contractor business. Puttuck is duly licensed by
the State of Utah as a general contractor. Breakthrough Construction builds homes in and about Park City
and Summit County, Utah.
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*****

JOHN F. FAY, Esq.

USB No. 5691

Trial Counsel
Gregory Barton & Swapp
Suite 300
2975 West Executive Plcwy
Lehi, UT 84043
Tel: 801.990.1919
Fax.: 801.990.1976

;KIHD DISTRICT COURT-SUIWI

200? DEC 27 AH 8-- IS
FILED BY.

Counsel for Plaintiffs

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH
JOHN HALE, an individual and CHARIS
CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
and JURY DEMAND

)

PETER GENDRON, WELLIAM GENDRON,)
HANK LANGE and LRG, Inc., and Does 1 )
thru 10, Inclusive,
)
Defendants.
)

Civil No.: d>/)S&>

13& {7iV

JUDGE: BRUCE LUBECK

Comes now Plaintiffs and allege:

FACTUAL_J5ACKGROUND:
1-

Plaintiff JOHN HALE [hereinafter HALE] is now, and at all relevant times was, a resident

of Salt Lake City and County, Utah all within the jurisdictional boundaries of this judicial district.

2-

Plaintiff HALE is now, and at all relevant times was, the co-owner of Plaintiff CHAPJS

CONSTRUCTION, hereinafter CHARIS] a general contractor busmess in Park City, Utah. HALE is
duly licensed by the State of Utah as a general contractor. CHAPJS builds homes and does other construction business in and about Park City in Summit County and Salt Lake City and County, Utah

